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Abstract 
Numerous studies have discussed that even if fundamental for innovation and 
economic growth, SMEs are often financially more constrained than large firms. 
Therefore, venture capitalists are often the only available sources of financing to 
small and young companies. Through the analysis of a database that includes 160 
funding deals signed in Italy, we research for empirical evidence of the 
determinants and effects of VC and PE investments. We find that VC and PE 
funds are more likely to finance younger and smaller firms. We confirm the 
presence of the certification effect under new circumstances applying to SMEs. 
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1  Introduction  
 In recent years a significant part of economic literature has highlighted the 
vital role that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) can play in contributing to 
economic development and innovation (Audretsch et al., 1999; Thurik et al., 
2002). This is particularly true for companies operating in innovative sectors, 
where generally the values of intangibles are more significant, whilst investments 
in fixed assets and working capital are lower.  
 The relevance of SMEs for economic development become particularly 
noteworthy for countries like Italy, where small and medium-sized enterprises 
account for the majority of the productive system, with a significant capacity to 
be present in different geographical areas, as well as to support different features 
of the industrial districts (Hart and Hanvey, 1995; Callejon and Segarra, 1999). 
 Although SMEs are considered as particularly useful for economic 
development, several studies have shown that these firms are often more financial 
constrained than larger firms (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a). From this 
perspective, banks lending often fails to meet the needs for their funding, because 
they fail to correctly assess the risk profile of such firms, especially for the 
smaller sized. In addition, smaller companies often lack an adequate historical 
trend certifying for their creditworthiness. Therefore, a small business with little 
track record looking for external capital, may face constricted funding sources, 
deterring the possibility of business to grow.  
 Because of these circumstances, for entrepreneurs trying to start a company, 
especially where intangible assets are at the core of the business, venture 
capitalists (VCs) are often the only available sources of financing. From this 
perspective, VCs act as professional investors with deep knowledge of the market 
based on their previous managerial experience. Their involvement usually implies 
sharp changes to both corporate governance models and relations with 
stakeholders, factors that are often seen as foundational for better future 
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performance (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). Similarly, relevant changes also 
accompany the involvement of private equity firms (PEs), which generally serve 
larger established companies that need to improve their results or resolve issues of 
ownership succession. 
 The US market in this regard constitutes an important example of the vital 
role that VCs and PEs may have to financing businesses, especially innovative, 
such as all the major high-tech and internet companies which have developed in 
last 20 years in the US. On the opposite, very different appears the situation in 
Europe, particularly in countries like Italy, where the presence of VC and PE 
players is smaller and where the weight of banks loans to the economy is far more 
important than in the US. Not surprisingly, in these countries we notice that 
innovative companies face more difficulties to find the funding for their 
development, especially in their early stages, reducing their capability to grow as 
fast as well as they can elsewhere. 
 For all those reasons, we considered as of particular interest to analyze the 
Italian market, in order to assess whether in this country the undertaking of VC 
and PE is actually able to constitute a valuable resource for firms growth, 
especially for more innovative SMEs, so that they could support economic 
development and innovation in this economy. Moreover, we consider this finding 
can be of a general interest also for other countries characterized by developing 
financial infrastructure or by an extreme reliance on banks in providing financing 
to the economy. 
 The first aim of this study is to advance knowledge of the SME financing 
market in Italy and to compare the results with experiences elsewhere. To obtain a 
representative sample of Italian firms financed by VC or PE money (backed 
firms), we used a database in which information about VC and PE transactions 
has been matched with balance-sheet data. (Data are selected from the PE 
Monitor yearly newsletters, AIDA and ZEPHIR—Bureau Van Dijk). More 
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specifically, the empirical exercises use probit regression analysis to test the 
relation between the probability of VC and PE deals and a group of variables 
(such as a company’s size, age and level of collateral) found to be relevant in the 
US. The empirical analysis also compares the performances - in terms of various 
balance-sheet indicators - of backed firms and non-backed firms. To explore these 
relations, we applied fixed-effect estimation, which controls for unobservable 
heterogeneity. 
 The ex post analysis of the performance is also useful to discriminate among 
different theories. One such theory predicts the so-called “certification effect”, the 
ability of third parties to certify the quality of information issued by relatively 
unknown firms (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). This notion has been tested and 
evaluated in many studies. Borisova (2007) apply it to the privatization process 
that has characterized European countries during the last three decades and find 
that a one percent decrease in government ownership increases the credit spread 
(used as a proxy for the cost of debt) by half a basis point. Analyzing another 
situation, Sufi (2006) examine the introduction of syndicated bank loan ratings by 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s and find that borrowers who improve their loan 
ratings gain increased access to the capital of less informed investors, such as 
foreign banks and non-bank institutional investors. 
 Many researchers have examined the certification effect in the VC and PE 
industries. Most have looked at how financial institutions help to resolve the 
asymmetric information inherent in the Initial Public Offering (IPO) process. Few 
have examined VCs and PEs as sources of information about the quality of SMEs; 
and in particular, we found no evaluation of the Italian case. Indeed, this study’s 
second contribution is to perform such an evaluation and to provide solid 
evidence supporting the view that VCs and PEs do provide such information. 
 This study adds to the existing literature by testing the certification effect 
through a combination of variables that previous studies have suggested confirm 
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individually the effect’s presence (Beatty, Ritter, 1986; Del Colle, et al., 2006; 
Borisova, 2007; Hyytinen and Pajarinen, 2007). In particular, we apply the same 
econometric procedure for the effects of VC and PE to the proxy variables, access 
to bank credit and trade credit (defined as the average length of purchases over 
the fiscal year). 
 Our results confirm that, as in the US, Italian VCs and PEs are more likely to 
finance firms that are younger and smaller, and thus riskier. Coupling these 
results with the phenomenon of sustained investments in intangible assets both 
before and after the date of funding, we can support the theory that VCs and PEs 
solve problems of asymmetric information. Looking at patterns of growth, rates of 
investment and sales recorded after funding, we find evidence consistent with the 
external investor filling the role of consultant. 
 Regarding the Italian market, we reject the theory that VC spurs innovation. 
On the contrary, most funding transactions follow periods of high investment and 
growth and precede slowdowns of growth and investment in fixed assets. (We 
interpret these slowdowns as fulfilling an implicit aim to consolidate firms’ result). 
Finally, the results elicit the certification effect, which is confirmed by a 
broadening of access to bank credit at better terms and the consequent reduction 
of trade credit; this is consistent with the theory of Petersen and Rajan (1997). 
 The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 draws on the main features of SMEs 
and the financial industry to discuss the potential positive interaction between VC 
and PE. Section 3 describes the theoretical background and the major 
contributions of the existing literature. Section 4 briefly reviews corporate finance 
theories and empirical evidence that help illuminate the likely determinants and 
effects of VC and PE financing; it also presents relevant econometric models in 
current use. Section 5 describes the sources of our data, their main features and 
the results for the econometric analysis on the determinants and effects of VC and 
PE financing. Section 6 concludes. 
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2  Constraints and solutions for the financing of SMEs 
2.1 The role of SMEs in economic development 
 During the postwar period, there has been widespread agreement among 
academics and practitioners that SMEs share several shortcomings when 
compared to larger firms. Empirical evidence consistently indicated that SMEs 
were less efficient, paid their employees less, were less innovative; consequently, 
they hindered economic growth. Generally, small size was perceived as a 
preparatory step before consolidation into efficient large firms (Audretsch, 2002). 
Since the 1980s this position has been reconsidered, however, due to the 
increased numbers and impact of SMEs in the most developed industrial 
economies. 
Recent economic literature cites several reasons for this changed situation. A 
loosening of the traditionally close relationship between size and efficiency has 
transformed production processes; this change has especially benefited those who 
have been able to recognize technological gaps and create flexible organizations. 
Workers have generally liked this new flexibility and have adapted to it in ways 
that improve productivity. On the demand side, specialized markets expanded 
according to changes in customers’ tastes; this required specialized production and 
more highly targeted allocations of resources. With these changed circumstances, 
in particular the recognition of the importance of a knowledge-based economy, 
new theories have reappraised SMEs as fundamental contributors to new patterns 
of economic growth. One key advantage for SMEs is that the tiny revenue margins 
that flow from continuous incremental improvements to products, materials and 
processes can often be sufficient for small businesses to be profitable; this is less 
often the case for large firms. 
While SMEs were being reappraised as entities capable of helping to drive 
the general economy, a large body of literature focused on the financial constraints 
that may hinder the birth and development of such new businesses. Lack of 
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internal financial resources especially intensifies operating risks for nascent firms. 
Young SMEs also face increased financial risks due to market imperfections, such 
as information asymmetry, transaction and agency costs.  
More generally, such enterprises face a financial system that is inadequate to 
meet their needs. First, smaller and younger firms usually lack managerial skills 
and the ability to convey structured information to investors (Caselli, 2004). 
Second, the operations and finances of SMEs are often highly opaque; this is 
because the identity of owners and managers often coincide. Consequently, 
backers, while running their evaluations, often privilege real guarantees to the 
future returns indicated by the firm, because of the difficulty to evaluate it. Finally, 
the risk of revealing proprietary secrets often makes innovative entrepreneurs 
reluctant to disclose details of their businesses (Ueda, 2004). 
Traditionally, banks have been key players in the financing of SMEs. Under 
the circumstances outlined above, however, the traditional banking business 
model appears to be incompatible with meeting the needs of young and small 
firms (Berger, Udell, 1998). It is in fact more compatible with meeting the needs 
of established medium-sized firms operating in traditional sectors. 
A bank lending to a small business essentially poses a type of agency 
problem. The bank (as principal) uses the firm (as agent) to generate a return on 
money advanced. This transaction occurs under conditions of imperfect and 
asymmetric information (Berger and Udell, 1995; Keasy and Watson, 1993), 
which relate both to pre-funding evaluation of the project and the entrepreneur 
(adverse selection) and to the post-funding monitoring of performance (moral 
hazard). Such information problems are not unique to small firms, but are 
considerably more prevalent with them because of anticipated higher costs of 
information collection. 
It is generally agreed that information asymmetry can be reduced by two 
mechanisms (Binks and Ennew, 1996). First, the provision of collateral as part of 
the debt contract; specifically, low-risk borrowers who leave the market in the 
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Stiglitz-Weiss model (1981) can signal their status by a willingness to offer 
appropriate levels of collateral. Second, the development of a close working 
relationship between the lender and the borrower. A close relationship can provide 
the bank with a better understanding of a business’s operating environment, the 
owner’s managerial attributes and the business’s prospects. Stein (2002) stresses 
this technique, showing that local regional banks have superior skills in acquiring 
the soft information that flows from ongoing contact with small firms active in the 
area. The less hierarchical and rigid operational styles of local banks are the key 
elements that allow for the acquisition of non-computable information which is 
the typical outcome of the relationship lending business model. 
Nevertheless, SMEs have intrinsic characteristics that can hinder the 
relationship lending process. They face severe adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems due to the technologically intensive nature of their activities and their 
lack of track records. In addition, most of their assets are firm specific or 
intangible and hence cannot be pledged as collateral. Accordingly, credit rationing 
is especially acute for smaller, younger and independent businesses. In fact, they 
report more difficulties than other firms when asking for bank credit. Moreover, 
Del Colle, Finaldi Russo and Generale (2006) show that small business are usually 
affected by multiple lending relationships with banks, which can imply a lower 
information disclosure. The last outcome highlights the weaknesses of the 
relationship lending model, which sees the unique long-term interaction between 
firm and bank as the way to resolve information asymmetries. Further, the study 
of Panetta, Schivardi, Shum (2004) on the effects of the concentration of the 
Italian banking industry suggests that the portion of credit allocated to small 
business decreases in the long run after a bank merger; this is because the larger 
more complex organizations make it more difficult for bankers to maintain 
personal relationships with small entrepeneurial firms. 
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2.2 VC and PE as a solution for the financing of SMEs 
In line with the above, several authors have suggested that VCs and PEs are 
the financial intermediaries best suited for situations where information is 
significantly asymmetric. Indeed, these forms of financing have been very 
successful in the US, having fueled the growth of many high-technology firms. 
The well known fortunes of such ventures as Yahoo!, eBay, Microsoft and Apple 
convinced many policymakers and entrepreneurship scholars to regard startups 
and VCs as driving forces for economic growth, job creation and structural change. 
Regarding the Italian case, data gathered by the Private Equity Monitor (PEM©) 
on PE funding transactions occurring in 2005 and 2006 show that most involved 
firms recorded sales of less than €60 million, confirming the close relationship 
between SMEs and PE. 
There are many factors that favor the involvement of VCs and PEs in funding 
SMEs. First, they hold stakes in all firms they back, and keep greater control 
rights where they believe that the entrepreneur must be induced to greater effort to 
ensure a project’s success. Their roll as stakeholder is enforced by an optimal mix 
of debt securities and equity securities that ensures the possibility that the backer 
may become a creditor or a partner according to what it perceives is needed to 
keep the entrepreneur fully engaged (Bernile, Cumming, Lyandres, 2007). Kaplan 
and Strömberg (2004) refer to this feature as a separation between control and 
cash-flow rights. Specifically, control rights allow the VC to participate in the 
entrepreneur’s key decisions. Additionally, VCs and PEs often grant capital 
infusions in stages, periodically reevaluating the firm’s prospects before each 
tranche. The shorter the durations of financing rounds, the more frequently the 
backer monitors the entrepreneur’s progress and the greater the need to gather 
information (Gompers, 1995). Finally, VCs and PEs serve to provide a 
certification effect. As we have already argued, the quality of small companies 
often cannot be observed directly. Thus, evaluators must appraise the company’s 
value based on observable attributes that are thought to vary along with its 
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underlying but unknown qualities. 
The appraisal process involves estimating the conditional probability that the 
firm will succeed, given a set of the organization’s observable characteristics. 
There are two qualitatively distinct categories of information that influence 
perceptions of the probability of a young company’s success. First, important 
constituencies such as potential investors and customers make quality judgments 
through careful consideration of the organization’s previous accomplishments. 
Second, the identity of existing management becomes a primary consideration 
when potential investors, customers, employees, suppliers and other exchange 
partners decide whether to commit their resources to a new enterprise.  
Since SMEs are greatly affected by information opaqueness and usually lack 
long track records, we are particularly interested in examining the impact of 
gaining exchange partners. We start by observing that social or industrial 
structures can be represented as a set of positions arranged hierarchically 
according to their occupants’ prominence. Baum and Oliver (1991) demonstrate 
that an organization’s ties to an institution signal conformance to institutional 
prescriptions and thereby help young organizations to acquire legitimacy and other 
resources. (See also Aldrich and Auster, 1986.) 
It is possible to identify three social mechanisms that may lead potential 
investors, customers and other potential exchange partners to appraise the 
characteristics of a subject SME's affiliates as they strive to assess the new 
venture’s unobserved and uncertain quality (Stuart, Hoang and Hybels, 1999): (1) 
relationships have reciprocal effects on the parties’ reputations, (2) well known 
organizations are perceived to have strong evaluative capabilities and (3) 
relationships with prominent organizations signal a new venture's reliability, and, 
thus, its high likelihood of survival. Together, these three social processes suggest 
that gaining a prominent affiliate serves to enhance a small venture’s perceptions 
of quality. 
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3  Literature review 
3.1 Determinants of VC and PE financing of SMEs 
The theoretical literature regarding the financing of small firms generally 
agrees that information opaqueness makes it more difficult for these businesses to 
obtain external finance (Berger, Udell, 1998). Asymmetric information problems 
between firms and financiers strongly affect their relationships and shape the 
contracts between them, especially terms about whether backing takes the form of 
debt or equity, whether collateral is given for any debt, covenants and the maturity 
of any loan. 
The form of backing can create agency problems. For example, debt 
increases moral hazard problems. Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), firms 
can replace low risk investments with high-risk projects, which increase the risk of 
bankruptcy but offer no offsetting gain to debt holders in the event of success. At 
the same time, as Carpenter and Petersen (2002b) suggest, a small firm’s marginal 
costs of financial debt could increase quickly because it has fewer tangible assets 
with which to secure loans. Thus, bank financing may not be viable. 
Unlike debt, equity finance does not increase the probability of bankruptcy. 
Moreover, agency problems are ameliorated because both entrepreneurs and 
equity investors share in upside returns. Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Aghion et 
al. (2004) propose a model based on control rights, which concludes that when 
size of projects becomes sufficiently large or when assets are increasingly 
intangible, firms will give more control rights to outside investors by issuing new 
equity. 
Inherent characteristics of innovative companies, including unclear growth 
potential and large investments in intangibles assets (which is common for 
high-tech companies), tend to create obstacles to raising additional capital. There 
is increasing empirical evidence confirming the theoretical prediction that 
innovative firms rely more on internal finance than on leverage. It also seems clear 
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that, at least in some countries, outside equity is a valuable source for funding 
innovative firms. Small firms can have more trouble in financing innovative 
activity. When they need to borrow, they are likely to do so on relatively poor 
terms (higher interest rates, shorter maturity) due to their asymmetric information 
problems; accordingly, outside equity seems to be their most suitable source for 
external financing. Borrowing can be difficult even for larger innovative firms. 
Based on a panel of publicly traded US high-tech companies, Carpenter and 
Petersen (2002a) conclude that, although large innovative companies have at their 
disposal more collateral to pledge against bank debt, difficulty in obtaining outside 
financing nonetheless constrains their growth. 
Myers (1977) argues that a firm whose value largely depends upon 
investment in future growth options would likely make less use of debt because of 
a glaring agency problem: the owner/manager can undertake investment strategies 
that are particularly detrimental to bondholders. Rajan and Zingales (1995) give 
empirical support to this prediction. Testing the relationship between 
market-to-book ratios  and leverage, they find it to be negative. Similarly, 
Barclay and Smith (1995) find that debt maturity declines with firms’ 
market-to-book ratio. 
The nature of firms’ assets can also affect expected agency costs, which 
opens the door for VCs to step in. Williamson (1988) argues that leverage should 
be positively related to the liquidation value of assets. In fact, tangible assets are 
on average easier to sell and receive a higher fraction of repayment than do 
intangibles assets such as patents or copyrights. Thus, a higher liquidation value 
implies that default is less costly. Subsequent tests, as in Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), confirmed that the relationship between liquidation value (measured as the 
ratio of tangible assets to total assets) and leverage is indeed positive. 
The framework presented gives factual hints about the role played by an 
external financer. Where such conditions are in place, there is scope for VCs and 
PEs to add more value than other intermediaries (Rennengoog, Simons, Wright, 
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2007). Screening and monitoring activities, though imperfect (Gorman and 
Sahlman, 1989; Manigart et al., 2002), and participation in the company’s board 
can potentially overcome most of the problems outlined (Cumming, Siegel, 
Wright, 2007). This may not apply to banks; because regulations limit banks’ 
ability to hold shares directly, they cannot fund projects through equity. Regarding 
the Italian market for SMEs funding, Panetta, Schivardi and Shum (2004) find that 
a bank’s merger seems to affect its specialization in terms of credit policy: the 
portion of credit allocated to small business decreases in the long run. This is due 
to size change and more complex organizational structure. 
In light of the above discussion, a hypothesis on the determinants of VC 
financing can be tested.    
Hyphotesis 1 Given the specific environment in which VCs and PEs operate, it is 
possible to identify a cluster of variables that affect their 
investment decisions.  
 
 
3.2 The economic impact of VCs and PEs 
Literature on economic impacts of VCs and PEs have focused on two issues: 
outcomes for the general economy and the performance of a small business after 
acquiring new capital. 
Regarding impacts on the general economy, numerous studies show that 
there is a strong positive correlation between VC and innovation. Hellman and 
Puri (2000) argue that VC-backed firms appear to implement new patents more 
quickly. Kortum and Lerner (2000) conclude that a dollar invested by VC is three 
times more effective in promoting patent creation than a dollar invested from a 
corporation. Still, the direction of causality between VC and the degree of 
innovation remains an open issue. Some empirical studies have found that more 
VC financing fosters innovation (“VC First hypothesis,” e.g., Kortum and Lerner, 
1998), while others have found that the external financer enters only after the 
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discovery of a new technology and meets the need to market such innovations 
(“Innovation First hypothesis”). Hirukawa and Ueda (2003) find that VC 
financing is more frequent in industries that have had an increase in total factor 
productivity, which the authors interpret as a proxy for innovation; after funding, 
productivity decreases. 
Regarding macroeconomic job creation, research has focused on 
understanding the relationship between employment growth and VC/PE funding. 
Studying a panel of 20 OECD countries, Wasmer and Weil (2000) find evidence 
of the impact on employment of an increase in the VC investment/GDP ratio. 
Belke et al. (2003) extend the scope of the inquiry, testing a virtuous circle 
between entrepreneurial dynamism, innovative startups, dynamic VC industry and 
job creation. The paper delivered pioneering empirical evidence of such links at 
the macroeconomic level, showing that VC is able to increase employment growth 
and new job creation significantly. 
Regarding the second focus area, several recent studies have empirically 
examined the relationship between receiving VC’s finance and firm performance. 
Sapienza (1992) finds that the performance of backed firms positively relate to the 
services that VCs provide. Two correlations particularly stand out: The more 
innovation a venture pursues, the more frequent are contacts between the lead 
investor and the CEO. And the more open communication is and the less conflict 
of perspective exists between the VC and the CEO, the greater is the value of VC 
involvement. 
Lerner (1999) evaluates the long-run success of firms participating in the US 
government’s Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, a major 
public-assistance initiative for high-tech firms. Those receiving SBIR assistance 
achieve significantly higher employment and sales growth rates than similar firms 
that did not receive SBIR assistance. These differences are most pronounced in 
ZIP codes with high VC activity. Jain and Kini (1995) add that services from VCs 
can include marketing advice and upgrades of the commercial network, which 
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foster increased sales. Based on 187 Belgian VC-backed firms, the work of 
Manigart and Van Hyfte (1999) contrasts partially with the above results. These 
firms do not achieve significantly higher employment growth compared to 
non-VC backed firms of the same industries, of similar size and similar age. 
Higher growth rates in total assets and cash flow, however, are obvious.  
Summarizing, many studies have argued and shown that the presence of 
professional investors can strengthen a company’s performance, due to many 
actions that these investors can take.  
Accordingly, we can test the following hypothesis for the case of Italian small 
businesses: 
Hypothesis 2 It is possible to determine the enhancing role played by VCs and 
PEs when evaluating the post-investment performances of Italian 
SMEs. 
 
 
3.3 The certification effect 
It is widely acknowledged that financial intermediaries can positively 
contribute as agents able to produce information about firms’ qualities. The 
seminal work of Akerlof (1970) highlights the plausible failures of a market with 
imperfect information. The model predicts that, without both defined guarantees 
and distinguishable quality, the market may fail. Only the average quality of the 
goods will be considered. This causes a “lemon market,” in which goods of 
superior quality are driven out. 
Using the same framework, Chan (1983) shows that when all investors have 
positive search costs (i.e., they are uninformed investors) entrepreneurs will find it 
in their interests to offer less desirable projects. This leads to the degeneration of 
projects undertaken. Thus, only “lemons” are offered, and investors will not enter 
the market. Conversely, when some investors have zero search costs, the 
allocation of resources is improved in terms of entrepreneurs’ efforts to spur 
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projects with higher investor returns. 
Both of the above studies note a lack of guarantees as a feature of imperfect 
markets. Investigating further, Booth and Smith (1986) find important evidence of 
the certification effect. The underlying theory derives from the expanding 
literature on the use of reputational signaling to guarantee product quality. The 
most notable work is by Klein and Leffler (1981). They demonstrate the 
conditions under which a non-salvageable capital expenditure can serve as an 
effective bond to guarantee the quality of a firm’s products. In fact, the 
non-salvageable investment is perceived by customers as a commitment to product 
quality, which will be rewarded as long as the firm does not cheat. 
Booth and Smith extend the reputational capital paradigm to explain the role 
of the investment banker in certifying the pricing of equity and risky debt issues. 
In a market where insiders have an information advantage that might facilitate a 
wealth transfer from outsiders, issuing firms may have the option of “leasing” the 
brand name of an investment banker to certify that the issue price reflects 
available inside information. In situations where insiders lack the ability to 
communicate their beliefs credibly or outsiders lack the ability to buy information, 
a potential market failure of the type identified by Akerlof (1970) results: Other 
things being equal, the proportion of over-valued firms seeking new outside equity 
will be greater than the proportion in the general population, leading outsiders to 
raise their expected probability that a firm is over-valued. This causes a decline in 
market value of firms. 
The following example helps illustrate the role of an investment banker as a 
certifying agent by leasing its brand name. Consider a firm that has limited 
investment opportunities such that, given the scale economies associated with new 
issues, it will seek new equity infrequently (say, every t years). The bond provided 
by such a firm is non-utilized except in those infrequent periods when the firm 
elects to seek new capital. If instead it can lease the use of a bond from an 
underwriter for the period necessary for inside information to become public, then 
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a perpetuity of rental payments with frequency t can be substituted for a 
non-salvageable investment in the determination of the firm value (the virtual 
guarantee bond suggested by Klein and Leffler, 1981). Thus, n such firms could 
successively employ the underwriter’s bonding investment over a single issue 
interval of t duration. In this manner, an underwriter can be perceived as a firm 
specializing in leasing the bonding investment to other firms seeking to raise 
capital. 
In order to test the model’s predictions, Booth and Smith developed a testable 
hypothesis regarding, among other things, the decision to use an underwriter and 
the amount charged for certification. The analysis provides evidence supporting 
the certification hypothesis by means of increasing firm value if bonding 
investments are made to certify the new issue price. In particular, the bond has a 
greater net benefit when issuing firms employ a specialist (say, an investment 
banker) who has made the requisite bonding investment. 
Most notably, the mechanism works because the financial institution exploits its 
own established reputation and charges the issuing firm according to the 
magnitude of asymmetric information. On this topic, we can generalize the 
contributions of Stuart, Hoang and Hybels (1999) who document how the 
performance of young biotechnology firms is affected by an inter-organizational 
certification, or endorsement process, operating in the industry's strategic alliance 
and equity ownership networks, as well as through the connections between new 
ventures and the investment banks that underwrite their securities offerings. 
Several bodies of work followed from the above implications. Some studies 
examined new models based at least in part on the formal certification hypothesis 
(James, 1990; Blackwell et al., 1990). Others examined more specifically how 
financial institutions help to resolve the asymmetric information inherent in the 
IPO process (Johnson and Miller, 1988; Carter, 1990).  
Megginson and Weiss (1991) bring consistent evidence that links the 
certifying hypothesis and the role played by VCs as better informed agents in the 
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competitive IPO market. They find that the involvement of a PE fund in an IPO 
leads to less underpricing. Their substantial contribution is proven by the broad 
literature aimed at testing their finding under different hypotheses and in different 
markets. Brav and Gompers (1997) investigate the long-run return for PE-backed 
(PEB) and non-PEB IPOs. They show that PEB public firms perform better than 
non-PEB ones; this provides evidence that the book-to-market ratio at the offering 
date significantly influences aftermarket performance. Dai (2007) finds that stock 
performance of VC-invested firms is significantly better than hedge-fund-invested 
firms both in the short run and in the long run. He concludes that coupling the 
positive role of VCs with substantial ownership, requested board seats and 
long-term investment works toward the presence of a certification effect. 
Also noteworthy are contributions of authors who found different results. 
Arikawa and Imad’Eddine (2006) discover that only the largest four Japanese VCs 
have a significantly negative impact on underpricing, while the top three 
underwriters have a significant positive impact. Munsters and Tourani Rad (1994) 
have been unable to determine any certification effect for IPOs in the Netherlands. 
Although this field of study has captured the attention of many researches, as just 
shown, little work has focused on providing evidence of a certification effect in 
cases where VCs and PEs back SMEs that are not involved in IPOs. This creates 
the opportunity to improve previous studies by evaluating eligible variables that 
can untangle the effects of having such a financial institution certifying a private 
company’s reliability, absent other public information. Therefore, we can test the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3 There is a positive relationship between VC funding and the overall 
perception of stakeholders, captured by such economic variables as 
interest costs to total debt, trade credit and access to institutional 
credit. 
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4  Methodology 
We have seen in Section 3 that no single theory is able to explain the 
rationale of VC and PE contracts. Accordingly, in this section we try to draw on 
corporate finance theories and previous empirical evidence for clues in identifying 
a list of controls that will help address the hypothesis moved and their relations. 
 
 
4.1 The determinants 
To test for the determinants of VC and PE financing specifically for SMEs, 
we first must understand what are their main characteristics and which of them 
might play a relevant role in investment decisions (Cumming, 2006). Therefore, 
the purpose of this section, along with the theoretical predictions found in the 
literature, is to present a set of variables that might be suitable for our analysis. 
In the field of economic research, it is common practice to use firms’ youth 
and size as proxies for informational opaqueness (Bertoni et al., 2008). This 
creates a link to the two major outcomes of the well-known asymmetric 
information theory: adverse selection and moral hazard. Both may arise in any 
investment environment, but they seem particularly acute in entrepreneurial 
finance. With large established firms, investments are made safer by the use of 
existing assets as collateral and by the development of reputation. Collateral and 
reputation effects can mitigate the negative effects of both adverse selection and 
moral hazard. An entrepreneurial firm, however, is likely to lack assets to provide 
as collateral and a track record necessary to establish a reputation. The degree of 
asymmetric information is also likely to be high for firms whose assets are 
difficult to evaluate, such as those whose main asset is a new product yet to be 
launched on the market or those with a large proportion of intangible assets. Thus, 
the financial literature unsurprisingly contends that VC and PE investors, because 
of their superior scouting and monitoring capabilities, are able to deal effectively 
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with the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard (Cumming, Fleming, 
Schwienbacher, 2006; Nikoskelainen, Wright, 2007). 
These first arguments help indicate which variables can serve our purpose. 
For the empirical analysis of the determinants of VC, we use the logarithm of firm 
sales (Size) as a proxy for company size. Age (in logarithm) is calculated based on 
the firm’s date of incorporation. We use Intangibles, defined as the share of 
intangible assets over the sum of intangible and tangible assets, to proxy for the 
difficulty of external investors to evaluate the firm’s activity. It was once 
considered a close estimate for a firm’s efforts at innovation. The Size and Age 
variables have expected negative signs on the probability of VC and PE finance; 
that is, the lower the age and the size, the higher the probability. By contrast, 
Intangibles should have a positive sign; that is, we expect higher rates of 
Intangibles associated with backed firms. 
Information asymmetry affects the decision of choosing internal or external 
capital. Contrary to the hypothesis of frictionless financial markets, as set forth by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), inefficient equilibriums do arise. Consequently, 
firms adhere to a “pecking order” of sources for financing their investments 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). They rely first on internal capital, the financing source 
with the lowest opportunity cost. After internal capital is exhausted, they turn to 
the external capital source with the lowest cost, which is usually debt (at least for 
firms with low leverage). As we have already discussed, however, SMEs 
(particularly innovative ones) have peculiar characteristics. Accordingly, Sau 
(2008) revises the pecking order, putting VC ahead of debt financing. On this 
basis, we introduce the variables Leverage and Short debt (in logarithm), 
respectively defined as the share of debt over the sum of debt and equity and the 
overall amount of short-term debt (both commercial and financial debt) granted to 
the company. As with Age and Size, we expect negative signs (for similar 
reasons). 
An investor may also be interested in the firm’s profitability and performance, 
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although the evaluation of such deals usually focuses on the prospects of future 
earnings. In consideration of the latter, we elect to use return on equity (ROE) as 
the basic measure of profitability. In this case, making any predictions on the sign 
would be difficult because conflicting interpretations coexist a priori: a high value 
may convey reassuring information on future returns to investors, but it also may 
be perceived as reflecting an abundance of internal resources, which is negatively 
related to the probability of venture financing. Furthermore, earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (Ebitda) proxies for performance. 
Provided that it gives insights into the firm’s ability to generate cash flows from 
its core activity, higher values are expected to raise the probability of financing. 
Finally, from the strand of research that tries to find connections between VC 
and PE financing and the degree of innovation, both at aggregate and individual 
levels, we identify as additional variables of interest Growth (defined as the rate of 
change of sales for each company), Capex (defined as the rate of change of fixed 
assets) which proxies for firm investment and the High-Tech dummy, which takes 
the value 1 in industries with a high “innovative” content4. In this case we expect 
all these variables will have positive sign. 
 
 
4.2 The effects 
In the previous paragraph, we showed that theories regarding asymmetric 
information affect the characteristics of SMEs. This in turn can shape the sign of 
the relation between such characteristics and the probability of gaining backing by 
VCs and PEs. We will find that similar intuitions will drive the expectations 
regarding the eligible outcomes once the investment occurs. In the first instance, 
                                                 
4 Using the four-digit industry codes, we classify a firm as high-technology if it belongs 
to one of the following industries: chemical and pharmaceutical products, aerospace, 
electronic equipment, media, telecommunications, and software and hardware. 
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Ueda (2004) presents a model in which the VC and the entrepreneur are equally 
informed about the projects; such parity facilitates financing to firms with low 
collateral but exposes the entrepreneur to the risk that the VC will expropriate a 
project. Consequently, the model also predicts that after the deal, profits should 
increase to compensate the entrepreneur for this expropriation risk. Hence, some 
measure of profitability ―such as ROE or return on assets (ROA)―should be 
comparatively higher than that of their similar firms. These ratios can nonetheless 
be undermined by other factors that arise after the involvement of the external 
investor, such as a striking increase in equity as recorded in the balance sheet or an 
ongoing campaign of asset acquisition. 
Let us further develop our inquiry into the presumed impact of VC funding 
on innovation. Indeed, gathering evidence on the consequences of VC should help 
us find the direction of causality. If the VC First hypothesis dominates in the 
Italian case, then we should expect increases in Capex, Growth and Intangibles. 
The injection of capital would stimulate the acquisition of essential inputs, 
enabling the manufacture and marketing of the product. If, on the contrary, the 
Innovation First hypothesis dominates, we would expect neither the accumulation 
of tangibles assets (measured by Capex) nor Growth to continue after the deal. 
Instead, we should see figures that indicate a consolidation of these figures. The 
organization should already have the assets it requires, and it is mainly seeking to 
boost its sales. 
In the Innovation First context, VCs and PEs can also serve as consultants, 
commonly for upgrading a firm’s marketing and expanding its commercial 
networks. This is especially true for small firms. Both improvements help foster 
increased sales and respond to a firm’s need to improve its results after periods of 
intensive investment campaigning or growth. VCs and PEs also bring with them 
new values (efficiency, for example) which they can transfer to backed firms. 
Under such circumstances, backed firms’ Sales should have better results than 
non-backed firms. Moreover, in the case of turnaround or buy-out operations 
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(presumably for larger firms), we expect increased efficiency, which we proxy 
with the (log of) Value added per employee. 
Finally, we remark on Hypothesis 3 concerning outcomes of VC and PE 
financing that can allow for the presence of certification effect. Practice tells us 
that when unambiguous measures of quality do not exist or cannot be observed, 
inter-organizational exchange relationships can act as endorsements that influence 
perceptions of the quality of young organizations. Consequently, the 
characteristics of a young firm’s affiliates sometimes influence valuations of the 
firm. Because strong relationships with prominent organizations convey the 
perception that young companies have earned a positive evaluation from 
experienced and influential actors, associations with high-status organizations 
elevate new ventures’ reputations. Therefore, endorsement by a VC or PE investor 
makes it easier for backed firms to obtain access to other external financial 
resources and to other tangible and intangible assets (for example, distribution 
channels, manufacturing facilities, sales force) possessed by other firms through 
the establishment of alliances (Colombo et al., 2006; Hsu, 2006). This latter effect 
further relaxes financial constraints on these firms, as they do not need to build 
these resources internally. 
Accordingly, the first consequence of a relationship with prominent 
organizations would be a greater expected likelihood of survival. We should be 
able to trace beneficial effects in the perceptions of suppliers. Accordingly, Trade 
Credit, a measure in days that represents the average length over the fiscal year of 
the purchases, would likely increase. Nevertheless, Petersen and Rajan (1997) 
provide striking evidence for different correlations. They find Trade Credit to be 
linked to access to bank credit in a way that suppliers could substitute for financial 
institutions. This is because suppliers have an advantage over traditional lenders in 
investigating the credit worthiness of their clients, as well as greater ability to 
monitor and force repayment of credit. Consequently, under this setting, the 
expected result from our analysis would have a negative sign. 
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Similar consideration could also apply to the measures related to debt (Debt 
short and Debt, calculated in logarithm terms), which we consider here as other 
components of the certification effect. We have already encountered a series of 
contributions examining the financial constraints on SMEs. According to these 
studies, VCs and PEs can exploit their established reputations to certify backed 
firms, and so improve the firms’ credit ratings. This can result in the firm gaining 
broader and better access to bank funds. We can reach opposite findings, however, 
when interpreting VCs and PEs in their role of helping to rebalance a firm’s 
financial structure. If this certification theory is valid, we would expect to see 
lower values for both Debt and Debt short. To test whether backed firms improve 
their credit standing, we apply a definition of ‘cost of debt’ (Financial Expenses) 
expressed by the ratio of ‘interest costs’ to ‘total debt’5. Hyytinen and Pajarinen 
(2007) identified this ratio. A negative sign, in particular, coupled with an increase 
of debt, would give clear evidence of better conditions applied to backed firms, 
which in turn would indicate the presence of the certification effect. 
 
 
4.3 The econometric setup 
In order to test the outlined hypothesis, we rely on econometric techniques 
applicable to panel data. This allows us: (1) to control for unobservable individual 
heterogeneity; (2) to use a large amount of information, including many 
companies and several years’ history for each company (thus increasing the 
degrees of freedom and reducing colinearity between the explanatory variables); 
and (3) to analyze the evolution of the variables in a group of companies. 
A logarithmic transformation has been applied to most of the variables. This 
procedure provides such beneficial effects steadying the variance, reducing 
                                                 
5 This ratio underestimates actual debt costs because the scaling variables (‘total debt’) 
include items that are not interest bearing. 
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multiplicative effects into additive ones and normalizing distributions. Since the 
transformation is not feasible when there are null and negative values, we add 100 
to each value and then calculate their logarithms. In particular, this was done for 
variables obtained as variations between two sequential periods such as Growth, 
Capex and ROE. 
 
 
4.3.1 Econometric setup for the determinants 
In this section, we present a multivariate analysis to test Hypothesis 1 that 
will allow us to quantify the importance of the determinants for financing through 
VCs and PEs. Based on the theoretical predictions regarding the variables that 
should affect the likelihood of external funding, we estimate various versions of 
the following probit model: 
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The multivariate probit model uses Backed as a discrete variable representing 
a choice from a set of mutually exclusive choices: it equals 1 when firms are 
backed and 0 otherwise. Yet to be described are controls Area and Year. The 
former focuses on geographical characteristics that may be involved in the 
investment decision. The firms are divided into three groups according to the 
location of their registered offices: the macro regions identified are north, center 
and south. This strategy joins the procedure for the selection of the control group 
described in Section 4.1. Finally, Year includes the years when the funding deal 
occurred and controls for specific common effects. 
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4.3.2 The econometric setup for the effects 
In this section, we present the procedure adopted to analyze the 
performance—in terms of various balance sheet indicators—of backed firms 
relative to the companies that did not receive this form of financing. For the main 
accounting and financial variables (denoted ,yi t ), we estimate the following 
fixed-effect regression: 
             , 1 2 ,y α β 0 β 13 u d εi t t t i tDeal Deal                     (2) 
where 0Deal  is a dummy variable that takes value 1 in the year of the deal. If 
the firm is financed more than once in our sample period, the dummy takes value 
1 more than once, specifically in the year of each operation. 13Deal  is a dummy 
equal to 1 in the three years after the deals, which is considered the average 
holding period for the VC industry. 
Regarding the estimation method, there is a discussion as to whether the 
individual effects should be treated as fixed or random variables. This is not an 
important distinction, however, because we can always treat the individual effects 
as random variables without loss in generality (Woolridge, 2002). It is critical, 
however, to determine whether these individual effects are correlated with the 
variables observed. To test for the existence of this correlation, the Hausman 
(1978) test is usually used. If this test does not reject the null hypothesis that the 
individual effects are not correlated with the explanatory variables, the most 
suitable estimation would then be the random-effects model and the best estimator 
would be Balestra and Nerlove’s (1966) generalized least squares estimator. If the 
null hypothesis is rejected, the within groups ordinary least square estimator 
would then be the most suitable estimator. More intuitively, implementing a fixed 
effect regression allows us to control for firm-specific characteristics that are 
time-invariant but that could be correlated with the deals, such as industry or 
managerial quality. 
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5  Dataset and descriptive analysis 
5.1 Dataset 
The first step was to construct a solid database of firms that received some 
sort of external financing and for which separate financial accounts exist. Turning 
to the Italian PE and VC Association newsletter, we were able to identify names 
of most of the actors involved in the Italian market. Only privately held VCs and 
PEs were considered; thus, all deals carried out by publicly controlled investors, 
such as agencies for regional development, were excluded. This is consistent with 
the research’s goal of providing evidence for the VC and PE industry alone. We 
also excluded all deals not characterized by direct investor involvement, such as 
acquiring shares of a fund of funds that has as general priority of portfolio 
diversification. The key objective of this research is to outline a general 
framework for investment deals realized by VCs and PEs with respect to Italian 
SMEs; accordingly, foreigner investors operating in Italy were included. 
In cases where the information about a deal was not published on the 
investors’ web site, we resorted to ad-hoc databases such as Zephir (© Bureau 
Van Dijk Electronic Publishing), which specializes in reporting information on 
merger and acquisition activity, joint ventures and PE deals. For the period 
1997-2007, a dataset of 730 deals resulted, including some firms with more than 
one stage of financing. 
To identify a threshold of what to consider as SMEs, we looked at the 
criterion established by the European Commission, which states6:   
A medium-sized enterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer 
than 250 persons and whose annual turnover does not exceed €50 million or 
whose annual balance-sheet total does not exceed €43 million. A small enterprise 
                                                 
6  See Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the 
definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises [Official Journal L 124 of 
20.05.2003].  
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is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 50 persons and whose 
annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed €10 million. A 
micro-enterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 10 persons 
and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed €2 
million. 
At this stage, we decided to focus only on industrial firms. As Booth and 
Smith (1986) note, public utilities and banking firms operate in regulated sectors; 
accordingly, the authors suggest, these firms should show different patterns of 
firm-specific risk. Moreover, due to regulation, these industries tend to have 
limited certification costs, one of the very issues this research aims to examine. 
The presence of leveraged buy-out operations (LBOs) required special attention to 
the correct identification of the legal entity entitled to issue representative 
balance-sheet data. If a reverse merger scheme occurred, the target company was 
the entity of interest; in case of a forward merger scheme, we looked for the 
balance sheets of both the spinoff (NewCo) and the target company. 
In light of the above concerns, we filtered the constructed group of firms and 
obtained a final sample of 160 VC/PE-backed companies. This number also 
reflects the availability of sufficient financial data in the database AIDA7 .  
Common problems, such as the lack of a sufficient number of observations for 
each firm and the exclusion of some from the database itself, prevented the sample 
from being bigger. This may likely be a direct consequence of our focusing on 
SMEs because looser disclosure policies might apply. Manigart et al. (2005) 
bolsters this intuition, finding clear evidence that firms generally switch to a 
higher disclosure policy just one year before a stake acquisition by a PE investor. 
For a control group, we matched each company in the sample group with a 
                                                 
7  © Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing. The financial data are provided by 
Honeyvem (www.honeyvem.it), which acquires and revises the balance sheets deposited 
in the Italian Chambers of Commerce. For each company, AIDA includes in a single 
document the figures of the previous 10 years, or less depending on availability, and adds 
information on shareholdings and management for the first 20,000 Italian firms. 
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company with similar characteristics but that had not received VC or PE funding. 
The control group was selected according to the following method: (1) We picked 
all companies active in the same region to control for the economic growth in that 
particular context; (2) We selected those companies that belonged to the same 
activity sector using the ATECO 20028 codes in four or six digits, depending on 
the case; (3) We filtered for companies that had similar sales revenues in the year 
of the funding event; and (4) Finally, we selected the company that was closest in 
age to that of the sample. In many cases, we found a company established the very 
same year. 
Because growth patterns of companies differ at various stages of 
development, we classified the VC-PE backed firms and their respective control 
firm into three groups: startup, growth and late-stage financing. The startup group 
includes firms that receive the first round of VC funding from the startup point to 
the moment they reach break-even. The growth stage group includes those firms 
with track records of earnings, and that receive their first rounds in order to 
finance expansion through capital increases. Late-stage investments includes 
buyouts, turnaround and replacement capital deals, which do not generally involve 
entries of fresh money into firms9. The same intuition may apply equally when 
comparing smaller firms and bigger firms; accordingly, within the sample and the 
                                                 
8 ATECO 2002 is the classification proposed by the Italian Institute for Statistics (ISTAT) 
aligned with the European counterpart, NACE. Under this classification, different 
economic activities are grouped in sections, subsections, branches, groups, classes and 
categories. For most of the sample, we were able to identify a control company active in 
the same region and in the same category of activity. Another classification system, 
ATECO 2008, became available as of the beginning of 2008; it substitutes a single 
activity code for the different ones that had been used for statistical purposes and fiscal 
purposes.  
9 In cases where there is not public information available, we use the firm’s age as a 
proxy for the stage of investment. In particular, we define early-stage investments as 
investments of a VC in firms no more than three years old. As a mere approximation, it 
may fail to state the real nature of the deal. A longer duration between foundation date 
and beginning of VC involvement, however, makes it more difficult to take into account 
the initial founding characteristics as crucial determinants for firm growth. 
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control groups, we divided the firms with total assets of less than €10 million in 
their first year of presence in the database from those with a value above this 
threshold amount. 
The methodology adopted has some drawbacks that relate mainly to using 
only public data. Many other studies send questionnaires directly to VCs and PEs 
to acquire more in-depth information regarding an investment’s financing terms, 
firms’ equity ownership and contingencies to future financing. The validity of the 
samples obtained, however, might be affected by: (1) survivorship bias, in that the 
survey is delivered only to investors who are still in business and (2) positive bias, 
because it is likely VCs and PEs report performance only of those firms that are 
doing well. Conversely, our dataset potentially addresses these issues because it 
includes information for firms that are either undertaking winding-up procedures 
or did not perform well. Nevertheless, as already mentioned, we could not track 
down the financial data of every company for two main reasons: (1) the sources at 
our disposal were not comprehensive about all the activities and (2) especially for 
SMEs, some companies are reluctant to publish financial data because of 
production and publishing costs and because publication and distribution of such 
information risks raising awareness among its own competitors. 
 
 
5.2 Descriptive analysis 
Table 1 provides an overview of the Italian market for VC and PE, as 
captured by the firms in our dataset over the survey period 1997-2008. It is 
showed how the industry behaved by geographical distribution, type of investment 
and predominant activity sector. Not surprisingly, northern Italy shows a high 
level of entrepreneurship (101 deals) with Lombardia leading all of Italy in terms 
of investments attracted. Central Italy accounts for 32.5% of the market, with 
Emilia-Romagna and Toscana playing significant roles. Southern Italy is 
characterized by a low level of interest by VCs and PEs. Campania, Puglia and 
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Basilicata saw only one investment each, and Calabria three. We did not include 
publicly controlled investors in our survey, however, and so the flow of 
investments for southern regions should be considered underestimated. 
Not surprisingly, Table 1 shows that sectors with high potentials for 
innovation were preferred targets for backing. The electric, electronic, and optical 
machinery and equipment sector, by its very nature, is involved in activities more 
prone to be technology driven. This is particularly true for companies working in 
fields such as IT solutions for firms and consultancy services, where intellectual 
capital is fundamental. In the more traditional industrial sector of mechanical 
machinery and equipment, there is a broad range of activities that imply an 
intensive use of technology. 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the control sample. The 
data are averages over the period before the involvement of the external financer. 
The time span considered is not constant over the firms, but is calculated on the 
first year each firm is present in the database and the year its deal occurs. The 
median firm of this group records sales of €12.2 million, total assets of €10.4 
million, 50 employees and is 20 years old. Intangible assets represent less than 5% 
of intangibles and fixed assets. Regarding profitability, the return on equity is 9%, 
and the median added value per employee is €51,000. In terms of financing, the 
sample shows a high degree of leverage (defined as the ratio of debt over the sum 
of debt and equity), mainly related to short-term debt (defined as the sum of 
commercial and bank debt due within 12 months). 
Panel B reports statistics for backed firms. For each variable, an asterisk (*) 
indicates that the difference between the control sample mean and the backed 
firms’ sample mean is significant at the level of 5%. Backed firms are generally 
younger (18 years old). They also tend to be bigger. The median firm has higher 
sales (€13.2 million) and more total assets (€11.9 million) and employees (61). 
This differs from the suggestions of theory and empirical evidence from the US. 
Combining these results with the reported means (column two), it can be argued 
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that there are few big firms that press the averages up. Indeed, in the 
backed-sample there is a wider dispersion—as measured by the difference 
between the 99th and 1st percentiles—of the variables that proxy for size. 
Regarding profitability, ROE and Value added per employee show better 
performance, though the difference for ROE is not statistically significant. 
Intangibles are discernibly higher; assuming that Intangibles can proxy for 
innovation, this result may strengthen the intuition that backed firms tend to be 
more innovative. The lower level of Leverage is statistically significant; both in 
terms of overall level and in the short term, the median firm relies less on debt. 
Trade credit, which is a variable of interest when investigating for the certification 
effect, lasts longer for backed firms. This is consistent with the intuition pursued 
by Petersen and Rajan (1997), who find that small firms that lack broad access to 
credit from financial institutions exploit much more trade credit, while firms with 
better access to credit offer more trade credit. In confirmation of this view, Debt 
service for backed firms is discernibly higher than for non-backed firms. This also 
indicates that backed firms carry greater interest expenses than non-backed firms. 
Panels C and D focus on the sample’s subgroup of large firms. The comparison 
indicates that backed-companies are younger and bigger, which conforms to 
results shown in previous panels. Moreover, they show better performance results, 
though ROE is again not significant. Intangibles remain higher, hinting at a more 
innovative attitude. Contrary to the evidence for smaller firms, large backed-firms 
are more indebted than those in the control group. Short-term debt represents the 
most important source of financing for both groups since the difference is not 
significant. It is noteworthy that both backed-subgroups grow less in terms of 
variation of sales, while the better level of marginality is reassuring. 
Summing up, the descriptive analysis shows that backed firms are younger, 
grow less, have a larger share of intangibles and are less profitable. Larger firms 
also have higher levels of indebtedness than the control sample. 
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6  Empirical analysis 
6.1 The determinants of VC financing 
Table 4 presents the results obtained by estimating equation (1). In column 
(a), attention is confined to the variables with coefficients from β1 to β8 
(controlling for geographical area and time dummies). This is done in order to 
maximize the number of observations on which estimation is performed. In fact, 
employing variables such as Capex and Growth would imply a loss of 
observations given that they are calculated over year t-1. 
Consistent with the theories of asymmetric information, the signs of Size and 
Age are negative; the existence of a non-linear relation between the probability of 
receiving external capital and size also emerges. For the variable Intangibles, both 
the sign and the statistical significance are positive. (We will elaborate below on 
the intuition that banks are more keen to grant credit to firms with higher 
liquidation value of assets.) For profitability, Ebitda appears to be an important 
determinant; we can anticipate that its sign and magnitude will be constant in all 
the model’s specifications. Given that Ebitda is a measure widely used in the 
financial industry to assess a company’s value (e.g., the “multiples approach”), 
this result can be considered consistent with the current state of the art. Conversely, 
investors seem not to rely much on ROE results and see other variables as more 
important predictors of a firm’s future performance. From its negative sign we 
conclude that internal finances are insufficient and are curbing the firm’s 
investment decisions, and hence its growth opportunities. (In this way, we would 
strengthen the theory of Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a). Finally, the negative sign 
of Leverage supports the intuition that predicts a higher demand for VC finance by 
firms that encounter more difficulties in accessing debt financing. 
We check the robustness of these results in various ways. We re-estimate 
specification (a) using different variable lags. In particular, if the variables are 
entered with a lag of one year (results not reported), the basic results are 
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confirmed. The exceptions are Size and Leverage, which become insignificant. 
Column (b) of the table reports the results obtained by estimating the richer model 
for the whole set of variables reported in equation (1). In particular, we introduce 
Capex and Growth to measure the firm’s expansion and Short debt to capture the 
access to credit. Results confirm that firms that are younger, smaller and have 
higher proportions of intangibles assets in their balance sheets are more likely to 
be financed. Leverage is still significant, though at 10% of significance, the 
dummy High-Tech and ROE are still not significant. Regarding the added 
variables of specification (b), we find contrasting evidence between the two 
determinants chosen to proxy for firm expansion: while Capex is positive and not 
significant, Growth is positive and significant. Accordingly, it is possible to argue 
that the firms that have as their most valuable asset their knowledge are more 
likely to gain VC financing. Finally, we find Short debt to be negative and 
statistically significant. This constitutes solid ground to state that firms with less 
access to channels of traditional funding will more likely seek capital through 
issuing equity. 
Column (c) shows the results when data for early stage financing are 
withdrawn. The estimates are consistent with the previous models, except for 
Leverage, which becomes not significant and changes its sign. 
 
 
6.2 Differences according to firm size 
As already outlined, attitudes of smaller companies may differ substantially from 
those of bigger ones. Thus, this part provides the same kind of estimations as in 
the previous section, but applied to a different data sample, firms with total assets 
of more than €10 million. We run estimations only for specification (a) and (b) 
because there are no firms in this subgroup that are eligible for early stage 
financing deals. Moreover, given the sort of firms that we are considering, we see 
PEs as the main potential backers. 
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Column (a) presents the estimates for the first block of variables. There are 
striking differences, such as Age is no longer significant and High-tech is both 
positive and significant. The first outcome reasonably highlights the positive 
relation between size and age, where older firms are more likely to be bigger. The 
second outcome provides a new intuition according to which PEs invest mainly in 
consolidated high-tech firms that already have feasible markets for their products; 
this supports the Innovation First hypothesis. Applying this finding, we can 
understand the lack of significance of High-tech in the case of smaller firms. 
Adding the second block of variables does not change the results set forth in the 
previous paragraph. Conversely, it allows us to draw a final comparison between 
the two richer models. The estimations show important changes, such as the loss 
of significance for both Growth and Short debt when compared to column (b) of 
panel B. A conceivable explanation for the change to Growth, is that firms could 
operate in mature markets and a PE fund’s investment is driven by the need to 
renew the board of directors or to restructure the company in anticipation of a new 
phase of expansion. Regarding Short debt, bigger firms have greater access to 
bank credit; accordingly, short-term debt cannot be a key driver for attracting 
external capital. 
 
 
6.3 The effects of VC and PE financing 
Table 6 reports the estimates for equation (2) for smaller enterprises against 
larger firms. We start by addressing the profitability of SMEs. ROE drops with 
respect to the other firms in the interim period (i.e., from t+1 to t+3). We confirm 
this by applying another measure for profitability, ROA, which is negative and 
statistically significant. At a first glance, this seems to convey bad news. If, 
however, we couple the estimate of ROA with Total assets, more reassuring 
evidence emerges: after their deals are sealed, backed firms went through periods 
of significant investment which shrank the index by increasing the denominator. 
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As Intangibles shows, the investments applied to both kind of assets. 
We tried to untangle the effect on backed firms’ performances by using such 
variables as Sales and Value added per employee. Both have positive signs. The 
presence of the VC or PE seems to enhance sales effectively during the interim 
period. As we have already argued, we find that this is due to additional 
consultancy services provided by the external professional investors. Value added 
is statistically significant, however, only in the year of the deal. We can try to 
explain this by looking at the outcome of the variable Employees, which has a 
positive and significant difference in the first year but not subsequently. Hence, 
assuming that Employees’ role as relative proxy for performance reflects this, we 
find a sound justification for the change in significance, namely the increased 
number of employees. Unfortunately, if we assume that this relationship is valid, 
we cannot outline any interpretation for efficiency. 
The next block of three variables allows us to comment on whether the 
presence of an external financial institution also plays an important role in 
generating a certification effect. One view is that backed firms gain greater access 
to credit, and this is shown by the variable Debt, which is positive. This is an 
important difference because we saw that this was not the case in the ex ante 
analysis. Moreover, the proxy we use for cost of debt (Financial expenses) has a 
significant and negative coefficient; this leads us to argue that with the entrance of 
a professional investor, the firm’s credit rating improves and it is charged lower 
interest rates. Finally, Trade credit is negative and significant. To explain this, we 
again apply the theory and evidence brought by Petersen and Rajan (1997), which 
establish a negative relation between the amount of credit granted and the 
exploitation of trade credit as a form of funding. Accordingly, we conclude that 
VCs and PEs do in fact help generate certification effects for small firms. 
For larger firms, the trends for most of the variables are similar. The variable 
Debt, however, lends itself to different interpretations that leave some open 
questions. When comparing results to those of smaller firms, Debt is not 
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significant during the first period while it becomes so during the following period, 
though with a smaller magnitude. One could argue that this indicates a need for 
the intervention of the external financer in rebalancing the financial structure. 
Nonetheless, large firms that have successfully dealt with PEs often undertake 
structured operations such as management buyouts (MBOs) or leveraged buyouts 
(LBOs) that imply a high use of leverage, which then usually shows on the 
balance sheet. Though this might explain the positive coefficient, our database 
does not provide us with sufficient information to untangle this issue. 
As a final remark, the evidence of pre-backing and post-backing performance 
combine to show a significant correlation between growth and the probability of 
VC backing. Accordingly, our data seems to validate the Innovation First 
hypothesis over the VC First hypothesis. Funding tends to occur after a period of 
higher than average investment and growth. On the other hand, the rate of change 
of fixed assets (Capex) decreases, and we cannot assume that the rate of growth 
for sales is higher than for the control group. These argue for the intuition that VC 
and PE funding lead firms to consolidate their results, rather than spur them to 
further innovation and growth.  
 
 
7  Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the characteristics of the relationship between SMEs 
and VC and PE investors by means of a database that includes 160 funding deals 
signed in Italy. The empirical analysis has shown that VCs are more likely to step 
in for firms that are younger, smaller and more endowed with intangible assets 
than the average. Additionally, it hints at their positive role when asymmetric 
information problems are of utmost importance and there is broad scope for 
adding value. 
At the same time, the ex post analysis indicates that smaller firms benefit 
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from VCs. Compared with the control group, they achieve better results in terms 
of sales, employment and expenditures on innovation. Moreover, considering that 
the capital infusions appear to be more frequent after periods of higher than 
average growth and investment, we can argue that larger firms resort to PE with 
the aim of consolidating their performances. Accordingly, firms value the 
additional consultancy services that PEs bestow. 
We also tested the hypothesis of VCs and PEs as certifying parties. Departing 
from the traditional background of IPO underpricing, which has been widely 
investigated, we outlined a new framework based on a cluster of balance sheet 
indexes. Thus, the original contribution of this study is, in our view, the 
confirmation of the presence of the certification effect under new circumstances 
and applying to SMEs, which are seldom considered. To test our results with 
greater reliability, however, it would be advisable to extend the analysis over a 
wider geographical area and to verify whether there are similar patterns across 
different countries. 
Finally, the empirical evidence bolsters the thesis that VC backs innovative 
businesses rather than supports new entrepreneurial ideas from scratch. From a 
practical viewpoint, it highlights the limits of private initiative only (embodied 
here by VCs and PEs) in encouraging innovative companies, and leaves to 
policymakers the task to bridge the gap. Not surprisingly, this is also the position 
expressed in several official documents issued by the European Commission. 
In line with the above, we suggest as a future line of research the further 
investigation of the characteristics of the Italian financial system with an eye to 
factors that inhibit VC from achieving its full potential. (The experience of 
Anglo-Saxon countries indicate that this could be attained under proper 
regulations). This research could include an assessment of the performance of 
state-owned regional agencies and the role of universities as incubators. Although 
we did not include these two sorts of organizations in our survey, we perceive 
their contributions as fundamental supports to startup businesses. 
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Annexes 
 
Table 1:  Characteristics of backed companies 
 
Distribution 
by Sector  
of Activity 
Hiring services, IT 
solutions, research 
e-services for firms 
29 18%  
Geographical 
distribution 
North 101 63% 
 
Electric, electronic, 
optical machinery 
and equipment 
21 13%  Center 52 33% 
 
Mechanical 
machinery and 
equipment 
19 12%  South 7 4% 
 
Wholesale and retail 
trade 
14 9%    Total 160 100% 
Food and tobacco 12 8%      
Metallurgy 11 7%  
Stage of 
financing 
Early stage 13 8% 
Chemistry 8 5%  Expansion 62 39% 
Others 46 29%  Late stage 85 53% 
Total 160 100%    Total 160 100% 
 
  
Source: Our analysis 
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Table 2:  Descriptive statistics (Panel A, Panel B) 
Variable Number of 
obs. 
Median Mean Std. dev. 1st percentile 
99th 
percentile 
        
Panel A: Control sample SMEs 
Age 160 20 23.8 14.9 6 94 
Sales (€ mln) 673 12.1 16.2 14.1 0.6 59.8 
Ebitda (€ mln) 673 0.9 1.55 21.9 -3.3 9.3 
Total assets (€ mln) 673 10.4 14.7 149.0 0.5 71 
Equity (€ mln) 673 1.9 3.4 0.0 43.1 19.3 
ROE 658 9 11.8 25.9 25.9 91 
Intangibles (€ mln) 672 0.1 0.4 10.7 0.0 5.8 
Tangibles (€ mln) 673 1.1 2.7 43.3 0.1 23.2 
Leverage 673 0.7 0.8 0.17 0.3 0.99 
Debt (€ mln) 673 6.3 10.2 12.0 0.3 55.9 
Debt short (€ mln) 673 5.5 9.0 115.0 0.0 55.9 
Gross margin (€ mln) 673 2.7 4.3 52.5 0.03 33.3 
Debt service (€ mln) 673 0.1 0.3 4.1 0.01 1.87 
Corporate taxes (€ mln) 673 0.2 0.47 7.3 -0.02 3.6 
Growth 574 7.6 17 62.2 -80.3 207.9 
Number of employees 648 50.0 85.1 113.2 2 601 
Value added x 
employee  661 51.0 59 37.5 2 263 
Capex 527 -0.2 39.3 806.0 -77 110 
Trade credit 671 97.5 99.0 98.3 0 434 
Net profit (€ mln) 654 0.3 0.6 11.1 -0.2 4.9 
Panel B: Backed SMEs 
Age 160 18 21.4* 15.5 2.0 71.0 
Sales (€ mln) 573 13.2 18.9* 180.1 0.0 83.9 
Ebitda (€ mln) 572 1.7 2.6* 28.5 -1.5 12.8 
Total assets (€ mln) 568 11.9 19.7* 27.0 0.3 141.0 
Equity (€ mln) 572 3.1 5.2* 72.7 0.0 31.5 
ROE 565 12.9 11.6 59.2 -102.7 81.5 
Intangibles (€ mln) 567 0.21 1.3* 30.3 0.0 16.4 
Tangibles (€ mln) 574 1.4 3.7* 62.8 0.0 25.8 
Leverage 571 0.7 0.7* 0.2 0.1 1.0 
Debt (€ mln) 572 6.1 9.4* 228.0 0.1 99.0 
Debt short (€ mln) 567 5.5 8.9* 131.0 0.0 59.2 
Gross margin (€ mln) 572 3.8 6.05* 7.2 63.0 44.7 
Debt service (€ mln) 573 0.2 4.4* 7.2 0.0 3.2 
Corporate taxes (€ mln) 574 0.4 0.66* 8.7 -0.4 4.4 
Growth 471 10.5 15.6 42.2 -92.5 191.2 
Number of employees 571 61 107* 13.1 4.0 560.0 
Value added x 
employee  529 56 67* 47.8 0.0 251.0 
Capex 449 26 36 71.1 -7.9 146.0 
Trade credit 577 109.4 121.1* 150.0 0.0 93.6 
Net profit (€ mln) 564 0.3 0.6 13.9 -2.0 4.9 
  
In Panel A, data refer to the control sample of SMEs. In Panel B, data refer to SMEs that 
received financing. * indicates that a test of the equality of means between the control 
sample and the backed sample is rejected (at least at 5%). 
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Table 2:  Descriptive statistics (Panel C, Panel D) 
Variable Number of 
obs. 
Median Mean Std. dev. 1st percentile 99th percentile 
        
Panel C: Control sample - large firms 
        
Age 160 21 24.8 14.9 6 94 
Sales (€ mln) 815 25.8 27.5 15.0 2.2 0.3 
Ebitda (€ mln) 815 2.1 29.7 37.0 -3.3 18.2 
Total assets (€ mln) 815 23.2 27.5 191.2 6.2 104.0 
Equity (€ mln) 815 5.1 7.1 62.8 0.1 34.2 
ROE 801 8.0 9.3 21.3 -63.0 62.0 
Intangibles (€ mln) 814 0.2 0.9 24.0 0.0 13.9 
Tangibles (€ mln) 814 2.8 5.5 87.6 0.6 47.8 
Leverage 673 0.7 0.7 0.17 0.3 0.99 
Debt (€ mln) 815 13.7 18.5 17.3 1.6 86.3 
Debt short (€ mln) 815 11.4 16.0 164.1 1.1 84.3 
Gross margin (€ mln) 815 5.9 7.4 5.6 0.3 27.7 
Debt service (€ mln) 815 0.3 0.5 5.5 0.1 2.6 
Corporate taxes (€ mln) 815 0.5 0.8 9.2 -0.6 2.9 
Growth 815 18.7 30.5 351.3 1.2 64.5 
Number of employees 786 110.5 134.3 119.1 14.0 783.0 
Value added x employee  801 57.0 65.3 37.1 11.0 229.0 
Capex 727 -1.1 32.8 28.7 -84.5 445.5 
Trade credit 815 107.0 120.4 91.0 0.0 463.9 
Net profit (€ mln) 796 0.4 0.7 16.8 -4.3 6.1 
        
Panel D: Backed-large firms 
        
Age 160 19 22.4* 15.5 2 71 
Sales (€ mln) 1627 26.1 29.8* 23.8 0.5 99.3 
Ebitda (€ mln) 1625 25.7 3.5* 43.1 -3.9 20.4 
Total assets (€ mln) 1626 25.0 33.3* 297.2 5.7 146.0 
Equity (€ mln) 1626 6.4 9.1* 10.0 -0.1 50.4 
ROE 1600 7.0 7.1 44.6 -0.1 84.0 
Intangibles (€ mln) 1625 0.4 3.5* 90.2 0.0 47.8 
Tangibles (€ mln) 1624 3.2 6.3* 93.5 0.06 43.6 
Leverage 571 0.6 0.7* 0.2 0.1 1.0 
Debt (€ mln) 1626 14.7 21.9* 24.2 2.1 129.0 
Debt short (€ mln) 1626 11.9 17.2 17.6 1.6 92.8 
Gross margin (€ mln) 1625 6.5 8.6* 7.5 -0.3 39.9 
Debt service (€ mln) 1625 0.4 0.6* 9.2 0.03 4.0 
Corporate taxes (€ mln) 1627 0.6 0.9 1.1 -0.9 4.6 
Growth 1627 11.4 13.9 1.8 9.9 17.3 
Number of employees 1594 113.0 145* 3.6 9.0 809.0 
Value added x employee  1544 60.0 68.13* 4.1 0.0 234.0 
Capex 1432 -0.1 37.6 38.8 -0.8 0.4 
Trade credit 1634 109.5 125.3* 106.6 0.0 466.0 
Net profit (€ mln) 1594 0.4 0.6 261.3 -6.8 6.2 
  
In Panel C, data refer to the control sample of large enterprises (defined as those with at 
least €10 million of total assets). In Panel D, data refer to large firms that were financed. * 
indicates that a test of the equality of means between the control sample and the backed 
sample is rejected (at least at 5%). 
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Table 3:  Variable definition 
       
Age   log of age 
    
Size  log of total sales 
    
Intangibles  ratio of intangible over the sum of intangible and fixed assets 
    
Ebitda  log of Ebitda 
    
Leverage  debt over the sum of debt and equity 
    
ROE  profit over equity 
    
High-tech  dummy equal to 1 for companies in high-tech sectors
    
Capex  rate of change of fixed assets 
       
Growth  rate of change of sales 
    
Short debt  log of total short-term debt 
    
Total assets  log of total assets of the firm 
    
Employees  log of total number of employees  
    
Value added x employee  ratio of value added over number of employees 
    
Trade credit   (average of commercial debt over purchases) x 360 
    
Financial expenses  ratio of interest costs over total debt 
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Table 4:  Determinants of investment decisions 
Variable (a) (b) (c) Variable (a) (b)
Age -0.311 *** -0.382 *** -0.382 *** Age -0.129 -0.181
(0.112) (0.121) (0.121) (0.148) (0.152)
Size -2.315 * -3.128 *** -3.12 *** Size -12.581 ** -10.544 *
-1.258 -1.394 -1.394 -5.422 -5.614
Size 2  0.061 0.082 ** 0.082 ** Size 2 0.358 ** 0.300 *
(0.039) (0.042) (0.042) (0.160) (0.165)
Intangibles 0.572 *** 0 .773 *** 0 .773 *** Intangibles 0.629 *** 0.810 **
(0.242) (0.259) (0.259) (0.327) (0.340)
Ebitda 0.429 *** 0 .582 *** 0.582 *** Ebitda 0.478 *** 0.642 ***
(0.101) (0.104) (0.104) (0.157) (0.160)
Leverage -0.544 * -0.424 * 0.11 Leverage -0.375 0.056
(0.329) (0.309) (0.605) (0.469) (0.809)
ROE -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 ROE -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
High-tech  0.113 0.143 0.143 High-tech 0.365 ** 0.323 *
(0.131) (0.138) (0.138) (0.187) (0.193)
Capex  0.0001 0.000 Capex 0.001
(0.0003) (0.000) (0.000)
Growth 0.002 * 0.002 ** Growth -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Short debt -0.470 ** -0.470 * Short debt -0.255
(0.171) (0..171) (0.380)
Number of Obs. 492 453 448 Number of Obs. 268 251
Pseudo R2 0.1519 0.1625 0.1883 Pseudo R2 0.1501 0.1296
Observed probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 Observed probability 0.000 0.000
SMEs Large firms
 
 
Probit regression results for the probability of VC and PE finance. The dependent variable 
is 0 if the company is not financed and 1 in the year of the deal. (Firms are dropped after 
the first deal.) The regressors are lagged one year. Column (a) reports the regression for 
coefficients from 1 to 8. Column (b) reports the whole model. Column (c) reports the 
whole model once early stage deals are dropped. The Large firms panel reports only the 
first two specifications. *** indicates a significance level of 1% or less; ** indicates a 
significance level between 1 and 5%; * indicates a significance level between 5 and 10%. 
 
 
Table 5:  Correlation coefficients 
Variable Age Size Total assets Intangibles Ebitda High-tech Leverage Debt short Capex Growth
Age 1.000
Size 0.195 * 1.000
Total assets 0.226 * 0.877 * 1.000
Intangibles -0.224 * -0.075 * 0.024 * 1.000
Ebitda 0.204 * 0.758 * 0.739 * -0.047 * 1.000
High-tech -0.157 * -0.073 -0.063 0.206 * -0.061 1.000
Leverage 0.058 -0.072 -0.053 0.021 -0.230 * 0.024 1.000
Debt short 0.215 * 0.825 * 0.897 * -0.003 0.610 * -0.021 0.319 * 1.000
Capex -0.015 0.022 0.044 -0.083 * 0.012 0.028 -0.018 0.030 1.000
Growth -0.149 * -0.087 * -0.145 * 0.009 -0.102 * -0.001 0.117 * -0.070 0.080 * 1.000  
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Table 6:  Effects on backed firms 
Variable
Number 
of obs. Year 0 Years 1-3 F-test
Number 
of obs. Year 0 Years 1-3 F-test
ROE 2817 -2.252 -4.820 ** 3.07 ** 1600 -5.034 -4.181  1.66
-2.272 -1.993 -3.529 -3.016
ROA 2791 -0.009 ** -0.011 *** 7.01 *** 1584 -0.018 *** -0.017 *** 12.01 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Total assets (log) 2851 0.198 *** 0.292 *** 38.82 *** 1626 0.142 *** 0.148 *** 13.12 ***
(0.041) (0.035) (0.040) (0.034)
Intangibles 2847 0.044 *** 0.044 *** 16.94 *** 1622 0.028 ** 0.031 *** 6.20 ***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010)
Ebitda 1574 0.122 ** 0.155 *** 6.22 ** 1508 0.065 0.011 0.59
(0.047) (0.055) (0.06) (0.051)
Sales 2884 0 .060 0.236 *** 18.37 *** 1619 0.041 0.128 *** 4.42 **
(0.044) (0.031) (0.051) -43
Employees 2809 0.024 0.221 *** 25.07 *** 1593 -0.074 * 0.074 *** 10.08 ***
(0.036) (0.031) (0.041) (0.034)
Debt short 2783 0.027 0.172 *** 9.03 *** 1623 0.015 0.091 ** 1.95
(0.046) (0.040) (0.054) (0.046)
Value added x employee ( 2768 0.092 *** 0.032 3.88 ** 1562 0.102 *** 0.035 4.5 ***
(0.034) (0.029) (0.0409 (0.033)
Trade credit 2431 -0.007 -0.066 *** 4.74 *** 1590 0.023 -0.086 *** 7.15 ***
(0.025) (0.021) (0.029) (0.024)
Financial expenses 2858 -0.002 ** -0.001 ** 3.40 ** 1624 -0.005 *** -0.004 *** 8.91 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Debt 2860 0.113 ** 0.268 *** 21.36 *** 1626 0.063 0.123 *** 3.7 **
(0.047) (0.041) (0.055) (0.046)
Capex 2506 -0.029 -0.061 ** 1.39 1432 -0.002 -0.045 0.61
(0.043) (0.031) (0.049) (0.041)
Growth 2544 -0.031 0.005 0.41 1453 -0.033 0.017 0.32
(0.037) (0.032) (0.054) (0.045)
SME Large firms
 
 
For each listed variable, we estimated the equation: yi,t = α +β1Deal0 + β2Deal13 +ut +dt 
+εi,t. where Deal0 is a dummy equal to 1 in every first year of the deal; Deal13 takes the 
value 1 in the three subsequent years. ut is the firm-specific effect, dt is the calendar-year 
effect, εi,t is a random error with zero mean. The specification is estimated with a fixed 
effect method by using each company as control for itself after the deal, which enables to 
control for firm-specific characteristics that are time-invariant. *** indicates a 
significance level of 1% or less; ** indicates a significance level between 1 and 5%; * 
indicates a significance level between 5 and 10%. 
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